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FEMINIST JUDGMENTS AND THE REWRITTEN PRICE
WATERHOUSE
Sandra Sperino*
In theory, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment
1
discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. In practice,
American courts have distorted this ambition by creating a host of complicated
frameworks through which they determine what counts as discrimination and what
does not. The Supreme Court has, at times, restricted the reach of discrimination
law by interpreting Title VII narrowly. However, even many ostensibly
proemployee cases have contributed to the analytical chaos of discrimination
jurisprudence.
2
In Feminist Judgments, Professor Martha Chamallas reimagines the canonical
3
case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized
that a plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII claim by showing that a protected trait was
4
a motivating factor in a negative employment outcome. In that case, the Court noted
that plaintiffs in discrimination cases should not be required to prove but-for cause
5
to prevail.
The introduction to the Professor Chamallas concurrence correctly notes many
of the rewritten opinion’s strengths. Professor Chamallas provides richer detail
about the facts underlying the case and the context in which Price Waterhouse made
its decision. She embraces an enhanced role for experts to assist the courts in how
discrimination occurs. Professor Chamallas also explicitly recognizes that bias may
occur even when a particular decisionmaker does not express overt bias. However,
there are many more contributions that are worth mentioning.
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1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
2 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS].
3 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
4 Id. at 244–45.
5 Id. at 244 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 262–63 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
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Professor Chamallas improves on the original Price Waterhouse by focusing
not only on the comments of the decisionmakers, but also on the role the employer
itself played in the outcome. The Price Waterhouse opinion itself focused largely
on the comments of the decisionmakers and did not emphasize the fairly
unstructured partnership selection process and the fact that people who made biased
comments about women were allowed to participate in partnership selection. As
Professor Chamallas notes, the selection process could have been less prone to bias
if the employer had taken steps such as “monitoring and structuring discretionary
6
decisions to focus on job-related criteria, skills and performance.”
Professor Chamallas also explicitly describes the limits of the McDonnell
Douglas proof structure and rejected current doctrine, which tries to divide claims
into so-called single-motive and mixed-motive frameworks. She points out that
Price Waterhouse itself could be a single-motive case, if the supposedly legitimate
criticism of Ann Hopkins reflected sex-based stereotypes. As Professor Chamallas
correctly notes, “we should not attempt to tightly constrain the methods of proof or
7
arguments plaintiffs offer in future cases.”
Professor Chamallas also avoids the trap of declaring the case as one that falls
within the label of an intentional disparate treatment claim. Title VII has two main
operative provisions: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2). Without much discussion,
the courts have viewed the first provision as an intentional discrimination provision
8
and the second as one that governs disparate impact. This dichotomy is court
created and is not driven by the text of the statute. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality
unnecessarily reified this dichotomy by focusing on the language in subsection
(a)(1), the so-called disparate treatment provision. Almost all discrimination
jurisprudence has focused on subsection (a)(1), leaving the full breadth of the
statute’s reach untapped, even more than fifty years after Congress enacted Title VII.
The (a)(2) provision prohibits additional discriminatory conduct, including limiting
employees in any way that would “deprive or tend to deprive” them of employment
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect [their] status as an employee” because
9
of a protected trait. Professor Chamallas avoids unnecessarily separating the two
provisions. It is a subtle, but important, nuance. When Professor Chamallas cites
to Title VII, she cites to the entire statute.
Professor Chamallas also soundly rejects the idea that Title VII jurisprudence
should indiscriminately borrow from tort law. Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse suggested, without support, that Title VII was a
10
“statutory employment ‘tort.’”
This reference has created undue havoc in
discrimination law, as the Supreme Court has recently started to interpret the text of
both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) through

6 Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 345, 359.
7 Id. at 356.
8 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.2 (1999); see also Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
10 490 U.S. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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tort law. As the Professor Chamallas concurrence properly pointed out, Congress
enacted Title VII in part because tort law and the common law idea of at-will
employment inadequately protected workers. She rightfully claimed Title VII as a
“distinctive body of public law that aims to eliminate longstanding patterns of
12
segregation, stratification, and lack of equal opportunity.”

11 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524−25 (2013); Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176−77 (2009).
12 Chamallas, supra note 6, at 349–50.

